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SCOTUS ON ABSOLUTE POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
ROBERTO .HOFMEISTER Pren* 
Introduction: Scotus on "Scientific Knowledge" (scientia) 
Each account of scientia advanced by Scotus presupposes the definition 
and the knowledge of the "first object" (primwn obicctum), He explores "first 
object" in three ways: (1) in its logical-epistemological function in respect 
to the habit of scientia; (2) in the relationship of the habit to its respective 
cognitive potency; (3) in the modality of the truths to be known in the habit. 
His explorations give rise to particular differences bet,veen "subject" and 
"object" 1• 
(1) The first object, even when it is taken in the scie1Jce of the contin-
gent as "first subject" (primum subiectum), is - as long as it is known as 
such - the epistemological ground of sci8n tific knowledge. "Subject" and "ob-
ject", each in a habit "as such" (in se) of the contingent ancl/or of the nec8s-
sary2, are also an object of the intellecti. If an essence is known perfectly, 
then as "the known thing", it can cause the habit that expresses its entire 
knowability through essential-necessary compositions or even accidental-
contingent compositions. (2) In the Prologue to Ordinatio, "subject" and "ob-
ject" are used in respect to the definition of the first object of a scientific 
habit fixed in Ord. prol. n. 142. However, ·where tvrn kinds of cognitive 
power are contrasted in relation to the habit of knowledge of the same ob-
ject\ "first object" differs from "first subject". Since in a habit in se of nec-
essary truths, the real essence has to be apprehended as such in order for 
"science" to be obtained in the intellect, "first object" and "first subjed" 
have, in a formal sense, a different meaning: "first oi~ject" is the proper con-
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t For this introduction as a whole see R. H. Pich, Der Begriff dcr wissenschci/r!iclien 
Erhenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus, 2001. 
'Whether as a species intclligibilis or not; see It H. Pich, op. cit., 4.1.1, and Con~ 
clusion l. l and 1.2. 
""Object" is above all a concept "respective to a lcognitivel potency of the soul'' 
luenndgenspsychologisch); see L. Honnefelder. Scienlia in se - scientia in nobis, in: T. 
Craerner-Ruegenberg· und A. Speer (Hrsg.), Miscellaneci Mediaeva!ia 22 •· Scientia und 
ars im Hoch, und Sptltmittcla!ier, p. 207. Of course, object of the cognitive potency and 
object of"the habit o(knowledge have different defillitions; see R.H. Pich, op. eil., L7.1. 
t See Ord. pro!. p. 3 q. 1.::1 n. 168 (ed. Vat. 1: 110-112). See RH. Pich, op. cit., 
Chapter 4. 
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ceptua1 content of the real object, which is required for scientia; "first sub-
ject" is a certain conceptual content of the real object, but not a proper ra-
tio. In a material sense, however, "first object'' and "first subject" designate 
the same thing; the real thing known in the science 5• (3) Whether as the 
real object in itself or as the proper conceptual content of the real object in 
itself, "first object" must be understood as "first subject" if contingent truths 
are treated in the habit of knowledge - above all, in the theology in se of the 
contingent. The logical-ontological basis for this is that the first object in 
itself does not contain uirtually the concepts, and therefore, the immediate 
and mediate propositions of that kind ofhabit 1;. 
There are, according to the Prologues to Lectura, Ordinatio, Reportata 
parisiensia, and Reportatio examinata 7, altogether five .kinds of scientific 
knowledge that the first subject/object, together with a proportionate intel-
lect, can cause. Four of these relate to the concept of scientia in se and to the 
Scotist theory of modalities of propositional objects to be known 8 • They are 
conceived to support the scientific character of theology. In all of them the 
initial knowledge of the essence of the first object or of the being of the first 
subject "as such" is the basis of the theory of science (as has rightly been 
noted, the function of explanation within this theory receives little atten-
tion from Scotusf 1). Accordingly, (i) scientific knowledge is knowledge in se 
of a necessary object under the proper conceptual content. This knowledge, 
which is determined through the primacy of virtually containing all the 
truths of the habit 10, consists in a logical-deductive system of necessary 
conclusions grounded on per se known and necessary premises. For scien-
tific knowledge in se of the necessary, three objective 11 conditions for perfec-
tion of knowledge have to be met: (a) certainty, (b) necessity, and (c) 
evidence. In the science in se of the necessary (d) the condition of discursiv-
ity is modified in non-Aristotelian ways 12• (ii) Scientia is also knowledge in 
se of a contingent object as contingent, namely of an immediate contingent 
proposition as contingent, where the scientific habit corresponds to a virtue 
0 See Ord. pro!. p. 3 q. l-3 n. 168-169 (ed. Vat. I: 110-113). See R. H. Pich, op. cit., 
2.2.4.:J and 4.1.3. 
"Id. ibid., 5.1, 5.5 and 5.6. For an account in Scotus of the •object" of the science 
of the contingent see ibid., 5.3, 5.4, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4. 
'See Lectura prol. p. 2-3 (ed. Vat. XVD, Ordinatio prol. p. 3-4 (ed. Vat. IJ, Reporter.ta 
parisiensia pro!. (ed. L. Wadding, XI.li, and Reportatio parisiensis I A prol. (eel. Wolter 
and Bychkov, I pro!. et d. 1-21). 
"See R. H. Pich, op. cit., 1.9 and 1.10. 
" See E. D. O'Connor, Thc1 Scientific Character of Theology according to Scotus, 
in: De doetrina Ioannis Drms Scoti, p. 17; R. J. Hankinson, Philosophy of Science, in: 
,J. Barnes ted.l, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, pp. ll0-l.11. 
'" See Ord. pro!. q. 1-3 n. 142-144 (ed. Vat. I: 96-97); D. Demange, "Objet pn!mier 
d'inclusion virtucUc" - Intrnduction a la theorie de la science de Jean Duns Scot, in: O. 
Boulnois; E. Karger; ,J.-L. Solere; G. Sondag (eds.), Duns Scot a Paris 1302·2002, pp. 
89-116. 
" On the "subjective" and "objective" character of these conditions of strict knowl-
edge, see R. H. Pich, op. cit., 6.1. 
'"Id.ibid., 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. See Ord. prol. p. 4 n. 208-209 (ed. Vat. I: 141-143). 
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or an "inteliectual habit" through which the truth of the contingent is af-
firmed determinate 1:i. This is an account of science taken "in a broad 
sense"H. Its conditions are (a) certainty, (b) necessity according to the 
knowledge and, in certain cases, according to the object 15 , and (c) evidence, 
which Scotus grounds on the possibility of immediate contingent and per se 
notae propositions Hi. (iii) Scientific knowledge is, in the third place, knowl-
edge in se of a contingent object as contingent, i.e., of an immediate and first 
contingent proposition within a sequence - the "first subject as such" - in-
sofar as, for that purpose, a condition of metaphysical necessity that is non-
relativizable is required. This model17 is exclusive to the theology in se of the 
contingent. It is the knowledge of one or several sequences of theological 
contingent truths whose epistemological grounding rests on the first sub-
ject as such (i.e., God's immutable will). The scientia that can be obtained 
on the basis of a first and immutable (contingent) truth includes the con-
ditions of(a) the certainty, (b) necessity, and (c) evidence of knowledge, and 
this habit of knowledge might be called a "contingent axiomatic method" of 
scienha 18 • (iv) Furthermore, scientific knowledge is the knowledge in se of 
the necessary and of the contingent. This is the Scotist habit of sapientia, 
which is analogous to Aristotle's notion of sophiarn. It relates only to theol-
ogy in se, and to it as a whole. The "wisdom" in respect of necessary truths 
is a knowledge with (a) evidence, (b) necessity, and (c) certainty, and con-
cerns (d) the most perfect and highest object. The knowledge in se of the 
contingent - of sequences of theological contingent truths - might also be 
placed in this theoretical locus 20 • (v) Finally, in the fifth place, scientific 
knowledge is knowledge of a necessary object obtained in a subordinate 
science (e.g., knowledge of the objects of geometry within the science of 
optics). Scotus does not relate it to theology, and it does not correspond to 
the definition of science in se. Nevertheless, its general characterization, at 
least, is of relevance for the present study, and will be offered in Part II 21. 
"' Ibid., n. 212 (ed. Vat. I: 145-146). 
l1 Scotus partially adopts this account from Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum. 
ordinarium a. 6 q. 1 in corp. (ed. J. Badius Ascensius: I f. 42B). See R. H. Pich, op. cit., 
6.4.5.1. 
rn See Ord. prol. p. 4 q. 1-2 n. 211 (ed. Vat. I: 144-145); see R.H. Pich., op. cit., 6.4.2, 
6.4.3, and 6.4.4. 
rn See Ord. pro!. p. 3 q. 1-3 n. 169 (ed. Vat. I: 112-113); Id. 3 p. l. q. 4 n. 238-245 
(ed. Vat. III: 144-148); Id. 8 p. 2 q. un. n. 299-300 (ed. Vat. IV: 324-325). See R.H. Pich, 
op. cit., 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 (also 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4). In this second model, Scotus 
definitely relativizes the condition of necessity - also because the second model is not 
conceived exclusively for theology in se, but also for contingent propositional objects 
generally. 
17 See Ord. prol. p. 3 q. 1-3 n. 169-171 (ed. Vat. I: 112-11.4). See R.H. Pich, op. cit., 
6.4 and 6.4.5.1. 
rn Id. ibid., 5.2, 5.2.1, and 5.4. 
"' See Ord. pro!. p. 4 q. 1-2 n. 213 (ed. Vat. I: 146). 
"" See R. H. Pich, op. cit., 6.4, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4. 
"'See Ord, pro!. p. 3 q. 1-3 n. 214-216 (ed. Vat. I: 146-149); see R.H. Pich, op. cit., 
7.2 and 7.3. On Scotus's innovations concerning the nature of subordinate science and 
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The first four models should reveal what logically and epistemologi-
cally is to be understood by "science in se": it is knowledge of a common 
esHence -- and it can also be knowledge of a singular essence~~ - insofar as 
the essence is in a perfect cognitive relationship with an intellect that is 
proportionate to it 2;l. There the essence is apprehended as such, and fur-
ther under its definitional - or quasi definitionaI2· 1 - con tent, and for that 
reason it can cause the necessary habit that unfolds its essential 
knowability. The sign of a perfect cognitive relationship in the knowledge 
of' the contingent lies, for its part, in the know iedge of the first subject as 
such 2°. 
Departing from the models above, Scotus takes a unique approach to 
the problem, presenting cases, in Rep. exam. Id. 4,2 q. 2 and d. 44 q. 1, in 
which what is ordinarily presumed to constitute "scientific knowledge" be· 
comes instead knowledge "as in most cases" (ut in pluribus) because of its 
account of God's omnipotence and/or of God's absolute power 2r;. One may 
wonder what differentiates these models of scientific knowledge and how 
Scotus conceives them. In order to ans,ver these questions, and to build 
upon work undertaken within a set of studies concerning the relationship 
between God's omnipotence and human knowkidge 27, I begin by exploring 
(I-II) the central theoretical aspects of Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1, i.e., those 
concerning God's omnipotence and God's absolute power and the general 
account of contingency, considering very briefly the background context of 
contingency and divine scienha in Rep. exam. I cl. 38-44. After these explo-
rations, (III) I next introduce the idea of a knowledge «as in most cases», 
which Scotus surely had encountered in Analytica. posteriora. I then analyze 
possible connections between omnipotence, absolute power, and knowledge 
ut in pluribus, as well as the limits of this approach in Rep. exam. I cl. 44. 
The Concluding Remarks consider Aristotle's treatment of the latter topic 
and ask whether that model of scientia was, relative to his previous mod-
els, a novel one for Scotus. 
the empirical evidence for principles, departing from the quite obscure clause "per 
expe1·ientiam", see R. H. Pich, Subordina~ao das ciencias e conhecimento experimenta!: 
um estu<lo sobre a reccp\:i\o do metodo cientifico de Alhaien em Duns Scotus, in: L. A. 
De Boni e R.H. Pich I orgs.1, A recepqao do pensamento greco-rimbe e juclaico no Ocidentc 
medieval, pp. 573-616. 
"" This is the case of the knowledge of the divine essence ut Jiaec. 
ia See Ord. pro!. p. 3 q. 1-3 n. 141 (ed. Vat. I: 95-96); R.H. Pich, op. cit., 1.1.1, and 
in Conclusion 1.2. 
1
·
1 Id. ibid., Chapter 3. 
"' Ibid., 5.4 and 5.5. 
'" Of course, this is not the first or the only textual context where Scot us mentions 
and deals with know ledge ut in pluribus; see for instance Super /ibf'()s Mctaphysicorum 
Aristoti!lis I q. 4 n. 9, 58, 68, 70-81 (ed. St. Bonaventure, OPh. III: 97, 113, 115-119); 
Ordinatio Id. 3 p. 1 q. 4 n. 23.5-237, 241-245 (ed. Vat. III: 141-144, 146-148). I wiH re-
turn shortly to these passages in the end of Section IV. 
"' See R. H. Pich, Onipotencia e conhecimento cientffico, in: C:. A. Lertora-Mendoza 
(coord.J, Juan Duns Escoto, pp. 1-17. 
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I. Contingency and Knowledge in Reportatio 
examinata I d. 38-44: Some Remarks 
7 
The treatise on future contingents, divine power, and divine knowledge 
in Rep. exam. I cl. 38-44 illustrates the more developed account that Scotus 
offered of topics already systematized years before (1298-1299) in Oxford 
(see Lectura I cl. 39-45). Although the line of thought about the cause and 
the very constitution of contingency in the world advanced in Lectura had 
been retained in Reportatio examinata, the whole material 1vas revised in 
light of contemporaneous debates at the University of Paris~H. As a \vhole, 
theologians were reacting to topics associated with the 219 articles con-
demned 1277 - particularly to articles such as :34, 51-53, 87, etc., which 
seemed to endorse a "necessitarianism" in the causality effected by the first 
cause~H. 
Rep. exam. I cl. 38-44 is part of the "lectures" on the Boohs of' Sen-
tences that Scotus delivered at Paris in the academic year of 1302/1303:w. 
The lectures should be viewed as offering his mature approach to their re-
spective topics;ii. As has been pointml out by J. R. Soder, it deserves atten-
·,s On the carreer and the evolution of Duns Scotus's thought in Paris, se" L. A De 
Boni, Sobre a vida e obra de Joiio Duns Scotus, in: Patristica t'I Afrdiacua/ia, pp. G6 L 0. 
Boulnois; E. Karger; J.-L, Solere: G. Sondag (eds. I, Duns 8cut a. Paris 1802-2002, 2004; 
J. R. Soder, Ein!eitung, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, Pw·iser Vor!csungen iibrr 1V1.,.s1•11 
und Kontingenz - Rcportatio Pa.risiensis examinata I 88-44, Lateinisch-Deutsd1, 
herausgegeben, i.ibersetzt und eingeleitet von J. R. Sode:r, pp. 24f. All quotations from 
Reportatio I A in this study follmv this 2005 edition by ,Joachim Roland Soder. I also lake 
into account John Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture - Reportatio 
IA, ed. by A. B. Wolter and 0. Bychkov, d. 38-44, pp, 448-540. The editors state in: idem, 
p. 448, note 1, that: "The Latin text ofDisttncl.ions 38-40, as well as of some subsequent 
ones, previously published by J. R. Soder (in Beitriige rnr C,e~chichtc cler Philosophic 
und T!teologie des Mittelalters, N. F. 49, 1999, and in the later edition published by 
Herder, 2005) was not used in the production of the current publication". 
"" For examples of the disapproval that Scotus expresses concerning T°hurnas 
Aquinas's accounts of contingency in the world, the cause of contingency, and the knowl-
edge that God has of future contingents, see Rep. exam. I cL 38 q. 1-2 n. 14-29. 51 (eed. 
Soder: 38-46. 60); d. 39-40 q. 1-3 n. 9-15. 60-66 (ed. Sdder: 70-72. fJS-102). Scotus adopts 
a similar attitude toward doctrines by Henry of Ghent, rejecting Henry's grounding of 
the reasons for divine predestination and reprobation !Rep. exam. Id. 41 q. uri. n. 21-
41 (ed. Soder: 126-134)) and for the understanding of the notions ofpossi-ble and impos-
sible (Rep. exam. Id, 43 q. 1-2 n. 4-21 (ed. Soder: 168-184)1. On this point, see J. R St\der, 
Einleitung, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, op. cit., pp. 24-26. 
,m As a requirement for obtaining the promotion to the degree of doctor and the 
nomination as a magister rcgens. See L, A De Boni, Sabre a vida ea obra de Joao Duns 
Scotu8, op. cit., pp. 56f. 
,H See A B. Wolter, Scotus's Paris Lectures on God's Knowledge or Future .Events, 
in: M. M. Adams (ed.), The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, p. 286; 1dcm, 
Reflections about Scotus's Early Works, in: L. Honnefolder; M. Dreyer; R. Wood (eds,), 
John Duns Scotus - Metaphysics and Ethics, pp, 12-13, 26-27: L. Honnefolder, Duns 
Scotus, p. 17, The Reportata parisirnsia, published in the editions by L. Wadding and L. 
Vives, do not relate tu the version of the Comments on Book I of the Sentences edited 
by J. R Soder, but rather to a transcription of poorer quality, which was probably made 
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tion that in I cl. 38-,14 the theory of"clouble contingency'' is reformulated, 
and the distinctions between "cntitative and operative contingency" and 
between "entitative and ·contingent necessity" provide a framework for 
very explanatory combinations of different causal powers. In this sense 
Scotus holds the view that the first cause is, in its own being, necessary, 
but it causes contingently ,vith respect to everything that is not its own 
essence; in a similar way, all intermediary causes are contingent "entita-
tively", since they are brought into existence contingently by the first 
cause, and can cause operatively either in a contingent way (when they 
operate through the will) or in a necessary way (when they effect some-
thing obeying their natural inclinations, and not through an act of the 
will). This would explain why there are effects "two times contingent", i.e. 
caused in a contingent manner both by the first and by a secondary cause 
(human beings's volitive acts themselves), and also effects caused in a 
contingent manner by the first cause but in a necessary way by secondary 
causes (such as acts of"natural" potencies, such as the intellect itself, and 
processes of nature that do not happen by chance). As was already implied 
in the context of the philosophical demonstration of the existence of an 
infinite being among the totality of being,?\ the combination of causal 
powers to be excluded is the combination of a necessary external causa-
tion by the first cause and a contingent causation through a secondary 
causea 3 • After all, that hypothesis would presuppose that the first cause 
causes by necessity, even if granted the immediately evident knowledge 
that there are contingent realities and contingent secondary causes that 
cause contingentlii,i. 
II. Ordination and Absolute Power 
It is within this context that Scotus investigates the epistemological 
status of the divine knowledge of the contingent and the logical-semantic 
status of the contingent that is known, as well as the assumption, to be 
clarified here, of processes of nature as regularities constituted contin-
gently and knowable in the manner of probabilities or idealized factual 
generalizations. In Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1, "Whether God might produce 
things differently than he did, or differently than according to the order 
instituted by Him now", Scotus invokes again the notion of omnipotence, 
between 1.312 and 1325 by William of Alnwkk - that is the so-called Additiones Magnae. 
See J. R. Soder, Einleitung, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, op. cit., p. 15. See also Th. Wil-
liams, Introduction -The Life and Viorks of John Duns the Scot, in: Th. Williams (ed.), 
The Camb1·idge Companion to Duns Scotus, pp. 10-12; A. Vos, The Philosophy of John 
Duns Scotus, pp. 115-11.6. 
''" See Ord. Id. 2 p . .l q. 1-2 n. 1-156 (ed. Vat. II: 125-221). 
"" See Rep. exam. Id. 39-40 n. 36-38 (ed. Soder: 82-84). 
"'' Particularly the human will; see J. R. Soder, Einleitung, in: ,Johannes Duns 
Scotus, op. cit., pp. 27f. 
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and more particularly the notions of absolute and ordinate powers·:i", in 
order to understand reality~ a move that has important consequences as 
well for human epistemic access to the moral and natural orders. Al-
though the following study has to presuppose and also to describe it, it is 
not directly concerned with the relationship between power and moral 
order, or between power and knowability of moral truths. By carrying 
forward my study of the relationship in Scotus's later thought between 
God's power and human knowledge, I also aim to set up an analysis of his 
logical-metaphysical and epistemological accounts of necessity and contin-
gency. 
In Rep. exam.. I d. 44 q. 1 Scotus clearly wants to hold the conclusion 
that God might produce things differently than he has already produced 
or instituted. With this aim in mind, he accordingly wishes to defend the 
following line of reasoning: It is not contradictory that certain things be 
made differently than they have been, any more than it is contradictory 
that some contingent things might never have been; God has the power to 
make anything differently that involves no contradiction in its being made 
differently, as is the case for all contingent things; thus, God might pro-
duce things differently than he actually produced, as is the case for all con-
tingent things 36 • It must be stressed that there is in this passage, and 
paradigmatically throughout the entire question ~ a fundamental point 
about contingency. Note that a contingent thing is not taken here as a vo-
lition or an act of the will. It seems to presuppose a cause that is contin-
gent for operating through contingent volitions in order to produce things. 
A thing is contingent in the sense that it could exist "or not", where the 
"or not" marks off the possibility of being different or being differently pro-
duced, without contradiction, by some cause. This account of contingency 
must hold for "ordinations" of any sort. It follows that their very constitu-
tion as contingent or not can be tested by some power. 
The topic of scientia ut in pluribus will appear particularly in Scotus's 
reply in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q . .1 n. 17 to the fourth objection of the ''uidetur 
quad non" in Rep. exam. I cl. 44 q. 1 n. 4. 'fhe argument there suggested that 
if a power like the power of God can produce things differently than (as has 
been actually) produced by Him, then such a power can move "celestial 
''° Historical accounts of the potentia absoluta I ordinata distinctio can be found 
in: W. J. Courtenay, IV. The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence, in: W. J. Courtenay, 
Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought, pp. 1-:37, as well as in: idem, Capacity and 
Volition. A History of the Distinction of'Absolute and Ordained Power, 1990. 
''" See Rep. exam. I d.44 q. l n.6 (ed. Soder: 190): "Aliqua aliter fieri quam fiant, 
non includit contradictionem, ut patet de contingentibus. Sed Deus potest quicquid 
non includit contradictionem; ergo etc.". In Leet. I d. 44 q. un. n. 1-2 (ed. Vat. XVI: 
535) and Ord. Id. 44 q. un. n. 1-2 (ed. Vat. VI: 363) - each versions quite shorter than 
the version in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1-2 and bringing a quaestio unica - Scotus formu-
lates the question and the structure of his answer in a slightly different manner; it 
becomes clear that to produce or establish anything means already in the question to 
"ordinate'' some state of affairs in some domain (moral and natural). 
10 IWBERTO H(JI'Mll!Wl'El\ PICH 
bodies" (corpora caelestia) differently than it moves them now:n - or, 
more simply, can originate different movements by celestial bodies than 
the current ones. As a consequence, heavenly bodies can be combined 
with each other differently than the way they are combined now. Scotus 
then says that ''geometry'' - or rather a natural science dependent on ge-
ometry as a subordinating science and which concerns physical bodies 
that can be known according to the principles of geometry, i.e. "as-
tronomy" - which is the scientific knowledge that deals with the "con-
junction" of heavenly bodies (de coniunctione) as they exist now, is not a 
"necessary science" (scientia necessaria). Geometry/astronomy would not 
be a knowledge of what is always true or "whose objects are necessary":rn, 
because geometry/astronomy would then be about things that can happen 
differently, and for that reason geometry/astronomy is about contingent 
things:iii_ Again, a contingent thing is what can be differently because it 
can be as such differently produced - and this is something that can in-
deed happen within the natural order of the celestial bodies. 
Scotus's point about the natural science he is examining here be-
comes clearer when we recall that for the Subtle Doctor there are basi-
cally two essential conditions for being a subordinate science (e.g. as 
astronomy is to geometry)'JO_ (i) First, the subject/object in the subordinate 
science is considered insofar as it stays under the subject/object of the sub-
ordinating science. As a result, the subordinate science is less general 
than the subordinating one, and its subject/object bears an additional 
accidental difference. (ii) Moreover, it is a necessary condition that a sub-
ordinate science takes its principles, or at least one of its premises, from 
the subordinating one 41 • Traditionally arithmetic and geometry are the 
mathematical sciences that subordinate the several intermediate (natu-
ral-physical) sciences, and they obtain in and by themselves the required 
know ledge of indemonstrable principles through the evident and immedi-
,n See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 4 (ed. S(ider: 190): "Item, si potest aliter res 
p.roducere quam produxit, ergo similiter potest movere aliter corpora caelestia quam 
modo movct, ct per consequens ipsa inter se potest aliter coniungere quam modo 
coniunguntur. Ergo geometria, quae est de coniunctione, quam modo habent, non est 
scientia necessaria, quia est de his quae possunt aliter se habere, et per consequens de 
cont.ingentibus". 
'"' See J. R. Si.ider, Obersetzungen und Anmerkungen, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, 
Pariser Vorlesungen ii.ber Wissen und Kon.tingenz - Reportatio Pa.risiensis examinata I 
38-44, p. 190, nota 229. 
'
1
" See note 37. 
"' See Aristotle, Posterior analytics I 13, 78b32-79"6 (LCL: 88-91). 
"' See for example Duns Scot~s, Quaestiones super libros m.etaphysicorum Aris-
totelis I q. 9 n. 40 (ed. St. Bonaventure OPh. III: 175): "( ... ): condicio una subalternatae 
scientiae est quod subiectum suum sit sub subiecto subalternantis, alia est quod scit 
'quia', ubi superior scit 'propter quid', et a superiori accipit sua principia ad probandum 
conclusiones". These two essential conditions are exposited in detail by R. H. Pich, 
Subordina\'.i'iO <las ciencias e conhecimento experimental: um estudo sobre a recer9ao do 
metodo cientifico de Alhazen em Duns Scotus, in: L.A. De Boni e R. H. Pich (eds.), np. 
cit., pp. 5 73[ 
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ate union of their simple terms - i.e., their principles are known per se. 
Astronomy for Aristotle can be classified as a kind of applied mathemat-
ics, yet precisely for this reason, that is, for being an applied intermedi-
ate science, it is "natural science" too, since, as the mathematical study 
of heavenly bodies and phenomena of the heavens, it is basically equiva-
lent to cosmology 42 , Practiced by the "mathematician-physicist", as-
tronomy comprises both the collection of data in order, first of all, to know 
the facts (hoti) and mathematical knowledge in order to establish, subse-
quently, the reasons (dihoti) for the facts 1". As it happens, it is above all 
Aristotle's De caelo that treats astronomy as a kind of cosmology, present-
ing Aristotle's geocentric worldview on the basis of previous works from 
Eudoxus and Calli pus. In De caelo the earth - relatively speaking a very 
small body - stands unmoved in the form of a sphere at the very center 
of the universe 4'1• The universe itself is arranged in concentric spherical 
strata, with moon, sun, planets, and finally fixed stars, each of which is 
conceived as ungenerated and incorruptible. Aristotle's universe is spa-
tially limited but temporally limitless• 1r.. 
The objection concerning "astronomy" in Rep. exam. I d. 4-4 q. 1 n. 4 
applies paradigmatically to natural sciences in genera1' 16. Accordingly, we 
may apply to them Scotus's reply to one general such objection in Rep. 
exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 17-18. It is stated in a farther objection in Rep. exam. 
Id. 44 q. 1 n. 5 that one consequence of the reflections about geometry/as-
tronomy is that there can be no "natural science" (scientia natundis), where 
again "natural science" is basically the knowledge of bodily (material) 
things according to the movements of heavenly bodies· 17• For if it is granted 
that heavenly bodies can move differently than the way they move now, 
then it would not be possible to know that these heavenly bodies or rather 
these movements are generated because of the influence of such part of 
'" Within astronomy, "mathematical astronomy" is superior to "nautical as-
tronomy"; see Aristotle, Posterior analytics I 13, 78b39-79"11 (LCL: 90-9ll. Because of 
the "dignity" of its object, i.e., eternal heavenly bodies in the several spheres of the cos-
mos, astronomy has some supremacy within the study of nature; see 0. Roffe, 
Aristoteles, Section 6.1. · 
.,·, See also Aristotle, On the Heauens, III 7, 306a5-17 (LCL: 312-315). 
""' Id. ibid., II 14 (LCL: 240-255). 
·" See 0. Hoffo, op. cit., Section 7.1. 
'"' More precisely, natural cosmological sciences, since Scotus does not actually deal 
in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 with any particular theory about the ens mobile as discussed 
in Aristotle's Physics; R. Cross, The Physics of Duns Scotus, points out to Lectura II d, 
14 q. 1-4 and Ordina.tio II d. 14 q. 1-3 as loci where Scotus deals with issues in as-
tronomy. For more on this point, see the concluding remarks to this paper. 
"' See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 5 (ed. Soder: 190): "Item, sequitur quod scientia 
naturalis, quac est de rebus corporalibus secundum mntus corporum caelestium, nulla 
esset. quia tune non posset sciri ista generari secundum influentiam talis partis caeli 
nee in tali situ, et alia alibi, nee per consequens magis generaretur in una parte caeli 
ignis quam aliud elementum, quia tali diversimode generari non contingit per motum 
varium corporum caelestium et diversam coniunctionum eorum, quae omni a secundum 
se aliter possunt se habere". 
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heaven, nor that they occur in such a place of heaven' 18 , and that other 
heavenly bodies or other movements are generated because of the influ-
ence of other parts of heaven and occur in other places or heavenly con-
stellations·19. It is not clear what kind of phenomena Scotus has in mind 
here. As the final section of Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. suggests -•~md as it 
has been interpreted by Soder'' 0 - it seems that Scotus is thinking here of 
the kinds of phenomena described in Aristotle's Meteorologica 51 , although 
there is no direct evidence for this. 
The same (fifth) objection invokes a further consequence of the reflec-
tions thus far. One consequence of the non-necessity of the movement of ce-
lestial bodies is that "fire" (igni.s) would not be generated "more" - better: 
would not be more likely to be generated - in one part of heaven than any 
other element would 52• Yet what does this mean? It surely means that there 
would be no clear knowledge about the generation of «fire» or indeed of the 
generation of any of the other "four elements". This is so because diverse "el-
ements" such as fire are, on the traditional account, generated in heaven by 
determinate movements of celestial bodies and by determinate conjunctions 
of them. But diverse elements being generated in diverse ways cannot be 
explained through diverse movements and conjunctions of celestial bodies, 
where "diverse" means that those movements and conjunctions can happen 
"differently" than they in fact do. Such a possibility of"diversification" in the 
ways that celestial bodies and conjunctions of celestial bodies generate move-
ments and elements would preclude all knowledge ofnatures 3• 
·'" See J. R. Soder, Ubersetzungen und Anmerkungen, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, 
op. cit., p. 191 n. 5. 
·'" See note 4 7. 
"" "Part of heaven" and "place of heaven" are understood and translated by J. R 
Soder as "Konstellation"; see J. R. Soder, Ubersetzungen und Anmerkungen, in: Jo-
hannes Duns Scotus, op. cit., p. 190, note 230. A. B. Wolter and 0. Bychkov, Trans]a. 
tion and Notes, in: John Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture -
Repartatio J.A, p. 532, translate quite literally as "particular part of the heavens" and 
"particular location". 
"' Aristotle's Meteorologir:a, partially built on his own observations and partially 
putting together the knowledge of his predecessors, is not str'ictly speaking a cosmology. 
As a part of physics or of the scientific study and knowledge of nature, Aristotle's me-
teorology, which today would comprise several different scientific fields, is concerned, 
at least to some extent, with physical processes that occur between earth and heavens, 
i.e., in the "sublunary sphere", and are effected, at any rate, both by the movement of 
heavenly bodies and the so-called "four elements". Although Aristotle actually dedicates 
himself in that work to a very broad range of processes of change through the four ele-
ments of earth, njr, fire, and water in the "terrestrial" sphere, he gives important place 
to generation and destruction processes and "astronomical phenomena which [hel re-
garded as meteorological", see. H. D. P. Lee, Introduction, in: Aristotle, Mete.orologica, 
p. xii:"( ... ): shooting-stars, meteors, comets and the milky way, rain, hail, snow, frost, 
thunder and lightning, winds of all sorts, haloes and rainbows". As a matter of fact the 
expression "ta meteora" means precisely "things in hung space". 
"" See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 5 (ed. Soder: 190), note 47. 
""Id.ibid. This last period of the Latin passage is difficult indeed. In my Portuguese 
version I have translated it this way: "5. Ademais, segue-se que nao ha nenhuma ciencia 
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Scotus's final reply to the objections in Rep. I Ad. 44 q. I n. 4-5 ap-
pears in Rep. I A cl. 44 q. 1 n. 17-18. They depend on and presuppose the 
detailed account of absolute and ordinate power that the Subtle Doctor of-
fers in the responsio to the first question 54 • The crux of his reply there de-
pends on one's account of the difference between an agent that acts de 
potentia absoluta and one that acts de potentia ordinata. The distinction 
itself is established to determine and specify the way how a free agent 
acts. Concerning every free agent who can act "according to a law" or 
"some right rule", but does not in fact act according to either, we have to 
distinguish acting de potentia ordinata or according to a law previously 
fixed, from acting de potentia absoluta"". 
But the context of Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 and parallel passages re-
veals that Scotus has particularly in mind (i.) a free agent who has the 
rule and can act according to it, (ii) and who does not necessarily act ac-
cording to the rule however, but acts "freely" (libere) according to it, and 
so can act in a different way''f,_ It is on the assumption of these terms that 
jurists distinguish between an agent's (1) acting de iure and (2) acting de 
facto - where the correspondences (i)-(1) and (ii)-(2) might be proposed. 
This distinction can apply in particular to every power of the (I) "judge" or 
''.judicative authority" (iudex) and of the (ID "judging person" (iudicans) 
or - as seems to be the case - to one person who has administrative power 
or political authority, with the Pope as a possible example of (I) and the 
prince of(IIY' 7 • These two are types of free agents according to (i) and (ii). 
However, we can certainly speak of free agents who act freely or through 
natural, que trat.a clas coisas corporeas segundo os movimentos dos corpos celestes, 
porquc, entao, nao poderia ser cnnhecido que esses si'io gerados segundo a influ{!ncia de 
ta! parte do ceu e nem lquc o siiol em ta! clisposi~ao de lugar, enquanto que outros lo saol 
em outra lclisposi~ao clel lugar. Por conseguinte, tampouco mais sei'ia gerado numa parte 
do ceu o fogo do que um outro elemento, porque, que tais [elementos] siio gerados de 
moclos d.iversos, nao ocorre pelo movimento diverso dos corpos celestes e pela con_jun(;iio 
diversa deles, todos os quais, segundo si, podem se dar diferentemente". Cf. ,Joao Duns 
Scotus, Reportatio exa.minata I d. 44 q. 1-2 n. 5, in: idem, Jodo Duns Scotus - Texlos 
sobre poder, conh.eeim.ento e contingencia, transl. by R. H. Pich, 2008. See ahm ,J. H. 
Seider, Obersetzungen und Anmerkungen, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, op. cit., n. 5 p. 191: 
"Denn class verschiedene Dinge je nach cler unterschiedliclwn Bewegung der 
Hirnmelskorper und ihrer jeweils verschiedenen Konstellation entstehen. kann nicht 
gewusst werclen, wenn sich a lies jeweils auch anders verhalten kann". 
:;., As a matter of fact, Scotus's basic account of absolute nnd ordinate powers in Rep. 
I Ad. 44 q. 1 n. 7-13 is llHH"e detailed and clearer than the previous accounts in Leetura 
Id. 44 q. un. and OnlinatfrJ Id. 44 q. un. 
"'' See Rep. exom. Id. 1 4 q. 1 n. 7 (ed. Siider: 192): "Dico quod in quocumque agente 
libere. quod potest agere secundum legern vel aliquam regu1am rectam et non al,,rit se-
cundum illam. in omni tali est distinguendmn de potentia ordinata sive ])raefixa lcge et 
de potentia absoluta". 
s,; See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. l n. 7 (ed. Soder: 192): "Quia enim habet illam regulam, 
pot.est agere secund1.nn illam, quia vero non necessario agit secundum ill am, seci"libBre, 
iden potest agm-e alio modn. Unde iuristae distinguunt de iure et de facto. Et sic potest 
clistingui de omni potestate iudicis vel iudicantis, ut Papae vel principum". 
"' Id. ibid. 
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free volitions, yet do not act according to «some right rule» and also not 
according to (i) and (ii), or more particularly not according to (i), for they 
are not persons like Popes and princes. On the contrary, like most human 
beings, they are to be understood as agents to whose wills the laws are 
not subject, but who are instead themselves bound to the laws';8 • 
What may happen is that when some of these non-legislating agents 
act freely, in the sense of changing or deviating from some established right 
rule, they act inordinately 59 . In Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 8 Scotus affirms 
explicitly that if conditions (i)-(ii) do not hold for the power of some particu-
lar agent, in that case his potentia absoluta is not ordina.ta. Once again, it 
seems that every rational and volitive agent possesses in a basic sense con-
dition (ii), but some or many do not possess condition (il. The strict conjunc-
tion of (i) and (ii) holds for a particular class of agents - and these agents 
alone can never act in any manner save an ordinate one. In a metaphysi-
cal and strong sense, all created agents who remain under divine law -- here 
moral law~ and do not have such a law bound to their will, are agents who, 
by doing something freely but differently than the law, act in a way that is 
simply inordinate@. Ifit is true that when an agent does not act according 
to a rule or law he acts inordinately for not having that rule or law bound 
to his own will, and if he nevertheless has in a specific way an absolute 
power 1' 1, then there is also a sense in which having absolute power means 
simply acting freely and differently than according to a rule{j2• But there is 
"" See Leet. I d. 44 q. un. n. 3 (ed. Vat. XVII: 535i: "Dicendum quod quando est 
agens quod confonniter agit legi et rationi rectae, - si non limitetur et alligetur illi legi, 
sed ilia lex subest voluntati suae, potest ex potentia absoluta aliter agere; sed si lex non 
subesset voluntati suae, non posset agere de potentia absoluta nisi quod potest de po-
tentia ordinata secundum illam legem. Sed si ilia subsit voluntati suae, bene potest de 
potentia absoluta quod non potest de potentia ordinata secundum illam legem; si tamen 
sic operetur, erit ordinata secundum aliam legem, - sicut, ponatur quod aliquis esset ita 
liber (sicut rex) quod possit facere legem et earn mutare, tune praeter illam legem de 
potentia sua absoluta aliter potest. agere, quia potest leg,im rnutare et aliam statuere". 
''" However - see again Leet. I cl. 44 q. un. n. 3 in the previous note - it is logically 
possible that it is instituted by the ordinate power of legislators that a non-legislating 
agent may act always through absolute power and the1·efore may change established 
right rules, and in this case he would also act in an orderly way. 
"" See also Ord. Id. 44 q. un. n. 4 (ed. Vat. VI: 364): "Quando autem ilia lex rect.a 
- secundum quam ordinate agendum est -- non est in potestate agentis, tune potentia 
eius absoluta non potest excedere potentiam eius ordinatam circa obiecta aliqua, nisi 
circa ilia agat inordinate; necessarium enim est illam legem stare - comparando tid tale 
agens - et tamen actionem ·non confo1-matam illi legi 1·ectae' non esse rectam neque 
nrdinatarn, quia tale agens tenetur agere secundum illam regulam cui subest. Uncle 
nmncs qui subsunt legi divinae, si non agunt secundum illam, inordinate agunt". 
'" See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 8 (ed. Si)der: 192): "Secundum verburn est illud quod 
si relatio ista non sit in potestat.e agentis, tune potentia absoluta non est ordinata". 
"" The distinction applies to "every free agent"; see Ord. Id. 44 q. un. n. 3 (ed. Vat.. 
VI: :!(·Ml: "Et ideo non timtum in Deo, sed in omni agente libere - qui potest agere sc• 
cundum dictamen legis rectae et praeter talem legem vel contra earn - est distingucre 
inter potentiam ordinatam et absolutam; ideo dicunt iuristae quod aliquis hoc pot.est 
facere de facto, hoc est de potentia sua absoluta, - vel de iure, hoc est de potent.ia 
ordinata secunclum iura". 
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an extended sense of absolute power whose application depends on the 
basic difference between moral beings as defined so far, i.e., the distinction 
between those who "possess" and those who do not possess rule or law. If 
someone is not under the law, but rather the law is under him as it is un-
der the authority of the ruler or legislator who institutes it, then he can act 
"differently" (aliter) in a sense where "differently" does not mean in a way 
that "deviates" but rather "change,s" law and, in so doing, "ordains" n dif~ 
forent law. This may help to clarify why, in the extended sense, to have ab-
solute power means to act f1·cely, differently than according to cm estahll.,hed 
rule, and also to change the rule. One can for this reason understand what 
Scotus means when he affirms that the ordinate power of the legislating 
agent does not exceed his absolute powerG:i_ Particularly in the case of God 
a~ legislator or Creator oflaws, ordinate and aLsolute power, although dif~ 
forent in kind - in kind of effects - are ofequal force in never possibly origi-
nating disorder or else exceeding ,vhat should count as an ordination of 
rules made practical, such that one potency (absoluta) can never make the 
other (ordinata) inorclinate" 5\ even though a new ordinate power - "new" 
because of a "new" ordination effected by an absolute power that also pos-
sesses ev1;ry order oflaws and rules, and not simply effocted by a free power 
- can exceed a law that was once ordained in some particular way. When 
this happens, a new "system" of ordinate power of laws replaces an old sys-
tem of ordinate power of 1mvs65 • 
Understandably, Scotus will insist later in the text that a positive 
answer to the main question does not imply the consequence "Therefore, (al 
,;:i There 1s a sense in Ord. Id. ,14 q. un. n. 3 lhat one who acts de potentia a/Jsoluto 
can ad "above" and "against" the law instituted, and hence absolute power "exceeds" 
ordinate power. But there "to exceed" most likely ,imply means "to change", ai1d so it 
does not invalidate the argument in Rep. exam .. I cl. 4,1, q. 111. 8, See Ord. Id. 44. q. u11. 
11. 3 (ed. Vat. VI: 368~364): "( ... J; et ratio huius est, quia pot.E,st agere wnformiter illi legi 
rectae, et tune secundum polcntiam ordinatarn (ordinala enim csl in quantum est 
principium exsequendi aliqua conformiter legit rectae).. el pot.est agere prneler illam 
legem ve1 contra earn, et in hoc est pot.entia ab.,oluta, excedens potent.iam ordinatam". 
i;.i This is affirmed explicitly also in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q, 1 n. l:i (ed. Si)der: 106): 
"Potest [Deus! ergo contra univernalem ordinem potcntia absoluta, sed tune nnn essut 
inordinatio, quia statuerel istam legem ordinat.am esse". 
0
·
0 See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 8 (ed. Seider: 192): "Talis enirn tenetur conforrnitr;r 
agere illi lcgi et secundurn illam regulam. Et icleo si non ;1gat. secundum ii lam, agit in-
ordinate. Uncle omnos qui subsunt legi divinae, qui non agunt secundum illarn vel si 
agunt contrH i.llam, inordinati sunt et. inordinate agunt Si m1tem aliquis non subest legi, 
sed econ verso lex subest institucnti, qui a pot.est a liter vcl alinm le1-;em onlinare, tnlis 
non pol.est inordinate agern, nee enim pot.cmtia ot·dinata cxcedit. potcn1.iam absolui:cun, 
licet cxcedat istarn legem sic ordinal.am", See also Rep. exam. I d. 44 n. 10 \NL Sodur: 
194). in note 90 below, and Ord. l d. 44 q. un. n. 5 (ed. Vat. VI: :364-3(;,5): "Sed quandn 
in potestate ngentis est lex et rcctitudo lcgis, ita quocl non est t'(,,cta nisi quia statuta, 
tune potest aliter agens ex !ibertate sua ordinare quarn lex ilia recta diet.ct; et. tamen 
cum hoc pot.est ordinate agcre, quia pntest st.atuere aliam legcm t·ectarn secundurn quarn 
agat ordinate. Nee tune potentia sua absnluLa sirnpliciter exceclit potcntiam ordinal.am, 
quia csset ordinata secundum aliam lcgcm sicut sucundum priornm; tamen cxcedit 
potentiam ord.inatam praecise secundum priorcrn legem, contra quam vel practer quam 
facit. Itu possct exemplil'icari de principe et subditis, ct lege positiva". 
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God can produce something inordinate, or (b) something not according to 
an order, or (c) something against every order". In Rep. exam. I cl, 44 q. 1 
n. 14, he speaks strongly against such an objectionnr>, calling it a "fallacy 
of consequence from the inferior to the superior vvith the mark of other-
ness [cum nola alietati.s]" 1". If"from inferior to superior" means the same 
as "from antecedent to consequent", I think that the objection wou]d take 
this form: Granted that if Goel produces something in this particular way, 
then He produces it according to an order, then it follows that if God does 
not produce something in this way, or rather if God produc.:es something 
in a dif'f'crcnt way, then He clocs not produce it according to an order. 
Within such a line of reasoning, the operator of "otherness" (alietas) at-
tache1; both to the antecedent and the consequent, and attaches negation 
both to the antecedent and the consequent, since negation iR implied its1::lf' 
by aUetas. This is why it is affirmed that "from the destruction of the 
antE.,ceclent, the destruction of the consequent follows, for otherness in-
cludes negationni;s_ Scotus would have been arguing that from the other-
ness of the antecedent - and hence from the negation of the antecedent -
the otherness and negation of the consequent do not fol'low, and this is 
log:ically correct. 
The present study concerns the relationship between power and scien-
tific k.nowledge of the world. It is not in search of conclusions about the dis-
tinction of divine powers and the mutability of the truth value of laws in 
legal and moral senses. Nevertheless, Scotus basically presents just such a 
consequence in the responsio, and it results from applying the distinction of 
powers particularly to God. Bringing into this context Scotus's assumption 
that the very sum and fundamental principle of natural law stricto sensu 
is "God must be lovt:d" - or rather "Goel must not be hated" 1"\ since such a 
command fulfills, in a primary sense, the formal criterion of self-evidence, 
fi{l The object.ion was advanced in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 1 (ed. Soder: 190): "Qula 
tune vel rnoclo ve! alias inordinate produceret, quod est inc:onvuniens". 
in See Rep. exam. J d. 44 q. l n. 14 (ed. Soder: 196): "Ad primum in oppo.situm dlC'o 
quod non sequitur quod modo vel alias ageret non ordinate, quia isle ordo, secundurn 
quern rnodo produtit re~, non est omnis ordo sibi po1,,sibi!is nee necessarius. E:rg-o sic 
argumento: 'polest produccn~ res aliter vd secundum alium or-dinern quam modo produciL 
ergo inordinate pot.est producere vcl non sect1ndum ordinem vel contra omtwm orclinern', 
non sequitur, sed est follncia consequcntis ab inforiori ad supcrius cum nota ulietatis, ( .. .)". 
HH Sec I?ep. exam. Id. 44 q, l n. 14 (ed. Soder: 1961: "( ... /, et it.a a destructione 
antecedcntis ad deslructionem consequent.is, qt1ia ulictas includit ncgationem". 
i;;, Sec alc<o Ord. suppl. III d. ;37 (eel. Wolter: 282): "Uno modo sic, quod illud 
pn:teccpturn 'Diliges Dominum Doum tuum', etc., non est simplicitcr de lege naturne 
inquantllrn est ufflrrnat.ivum, sed in quantum est negativum prohibcns oppositllrn. Sirn-
phcit.er enim co;t. de iege naturae 'non odirc', se<l aliquando 'amarc', dubitnt.um est prius 
in tcrtio articulo. Nunc nutl:m ex ilia ncgativa, non sequitur quod volcndurn sit 
proximurn dilligerc Deum. Scd sequcretur ex illo prneccpto nHirmativo, de quo non est 
c:crtum quod sit dt) lcge naturne stride loquendo". 
-,•o Sec Onl, Ill st1ppL d. 27 (ed. Wolter: 424). See also C.R. Cezar, Das naWr!iche 
Gesctz und das Jmnhretc prahtische Urtcil nach der Leh.re des dolwnncs Duns S'cotu::;, 
pp. filf"f". 
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for it expresses the claim "what is best must be loved above everything" 711• 
We can see that Scotus affirms here that further practical rules or univer-
sal practical propositions which are not deducible from that fundamental 
principle are ultimately va.lid as such not because of their consonantia 
with strict moral (natural-law) principles 71 but solely through their con-
crete institution by divine wisdom, Put more precisely, Scotus believes 
that those rules are more likely to be instituted by "divine will" - ancl he 
docs seem to include here the items of the second table of the Decalogue, 
as well as of Biblical commands that summarize them (like the second 
greatest commandn) or are related to these through consonanee. Very 
importantly, he also includes specific prescriptions concerning the atti-
tudes toward Goel that human beings must have to aehieve God's favor in 
an adequate way. Although some of these (wise and good) rules (such as 
the second table of the Decalogue) are arguably more accessible to natural 
reason than others, their unmistahable character as moral (wise and 
good) laws can, as a whole 7\ only be acknowledged through revelation, 
and this is equivalent to an acknowledgement of the expression of God's 
will and Iegislation 7'1 - where the emphasis should be put not so much on 
the "voluntary" aspect of the laws instituted, but above all on the fact 
that prescriptive laws, rather than principles of practical rationality 
stricto scnsu (see above)7", always require, since they are not a priori 
truths, the expression of a legitimate authority in order to possess their 
lega] character. (In another situation we could surely - and theoretically 
- imagine the case in which a given rational or wise authority institutes 
laws like those of the Decalogue's second table and many others consonant 
with them, with or without being aware of the fundamental principle of 
natural law stricto sensu, but then they would again depend for their 
character as prescriptive laws, in addition to the rational condition of 
consonantia, on the will and legislation of an authority. Scotus however 
usually thinks that non-divine authority is a necessary condition for the 
71 See for example Ord. III suppl. d. 37 (ed. Wolter: 278l. See also H. Mcihle, 
Scotus's Theory of Natural Law, in: Th. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Duns Scotv.s, pp. 316-317. 
,~ See Ord. pro!. p, 2 q. un. n. 108 (ed. Vat. I: 70-71). 
7
'
1 As a whole, it would be important to establish a difference, in respect of rules 
that can be instituted, between 'moral' in a general and rationally accessible sense and 




1 Sec also Leet. III d. 19 q. un. n. 23 (ed. Vat. XXI: 33-34): "Sed sciendurn quod, cum 
nullus actus finitus formalitcr habeat rationcm meriti nisi a voluntate divina 
acceptante, pro tot potest esse sufficiens pro quot potest voluntas divina vel vult 
acceptare, et pro tot est actus sufficiens pro quot voluntate clivina actu acceptatur, qui a 
bonum tantum valet alicui pro quanto acceptatur. Et quia omne aliud a Deo est bonum 
'quia a Deo est volitum et acceptatum', idco pro aliqua condicionc personae mcrcntis -
quae non est formaliter condicio actus merendi - (. .. )". 
7
" I.e. "God must not be hated" and what can arguably be strictly deduced from it. 
See also M. B. Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness. Mutuality and Moral Living ac-
cording to John Duns Scotus, pp. 52ff 
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institution ofpositive law, and seems to understand authority or rulership 
to be already legitimately constituted under the presupposition of protl,ct~ 
ing and promoting natural law (at least) in a broad sense 7ri), Scotus seems 
confident that we can realize through mason that the institution of such 
practical rules has indeed to depend - in an absolute sense - on God's 
wilF7, because they are such that we do not find in the "laws or practical 
propositions a necessity from the terms" (necessitas ex tenninis). The 
examples that Scotus chooses are "Every just man must be saved" and 
"Every evil mar. must be condemned". There is no necessity in them in 
the way that there is necessity in "Every whole is bigger than its parts", 
where, just as in analytic propositions, the concept of the predicate is in-
cluded in the concept of the subject7H. This explanation does apply - after 
all, since there is no conceptual reason for thinking that a "just man" 
himself causes his salvation and so explains the predicate "to be saved" 
when it is said of him, for there is between those terms no meaning relation-
ship. On the contrary, it has to be a will - and, in case of that theological 
truth, the 'Nill of God alone - that "accepts" both sides'\ 
The conclusion of all this is that, with exception of strict natural 
law, it is only a will that makes a principle or a law «to be practical>, -
"' Although it is arguable that pure "principles" of natural law lato sewm do not 
require authority for being sound, their "legal dlaracter" certainly does. After all, no 
contingent being can be a priori the term of an obligation or generate an uncond it ion al 
principle that rationally compels one to obedieneec. In the case of pure "principles" of 
natural law stricto sensu, we could argue that they not only do not require authority f'or 
being sound, but they also oblige any "wise" or "rational~volitive" being to obey it as a 
law. Explaining the potentia ordinata I absoluta distinction is not yet to explain what 
confers authority to someone or what is tlw origin of authority. Formally we might say 
that to have authority is for one to be in a position of having power for changing through 
free decision a given order of rules. But in the cRse of human legislative Ruthority, it can 
be affirmed that authority as such presupposes and has already as its purpose protec-
tion of and coherence with natural law lato and st1-icto scnsu. Criteria for the legitima-
tion of an authority (which in original conditions is the pater familiae, representing lifo 
under ius natrtme, and secondarily (in political sense) is positively transferred to a sole 
person or rather to a whole community for life in society, where the division of rulcrship 
stays already under the signal of positive law) is both protection and promotion of natu-
ral law, and shows the need for the institution of positive l mvs consonant with it: see 
for example L Parisoli, La philosophic normative de ,lean Duns Scot, pp. 101-106. See 
also John Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, ed. and transl. 
by A B. Wolter, Ord. IV d. 15 q. 2 pp, 38Al (conclusion 5: "origin of civil authority"). At 
any rate, Scotus insists then that "prudence" and "authority" are necessary conditions 
for promulgating laws; see also R. Lambertini, La pouerta. pensata. Evoluzione storica 
della definizwne dell'identita minoritica cfo Bonauentura ad Ochha.m, pp. 152-161. 
,., That is, on the will of a legitimate authority. 
78 See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 9 (ed. Soder: 192): "Ad propositum de Deo dico quod 
leges vel rcgulae practieae sive universales propo~itiones statutae Runt a sapientia 
· divina, Credo tamen magis quod a voluntate divinu, quia non invenitur in tali lege vel 
propositione practica necessitas ex terminis, ut in hac 'omnis iustus salvandus et omnis 
malus damnandus', sicut his est necessitas 'omno totum m,1ius est sua parte', ubi unus 
terrnimrn, scilicet subiectum, indudit terminum praedicati; sed in aliis non". 
7
" See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 9 (ed, Soder: 192): "lust.us enim non c,rnsat s.ibi 
salutem, secl voluntas divina accept.at utrumque, quia est de indifforentia in terminis", 
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to be something that must be done. Will is - and has to be, if there 
must be rules and principles of action - the causal principle of legisla-
tion and for the origin of the practical character of any further prin-
ciples or rules. Instituted in this way, laws thus ordain or prescribe all 
possible actions, i.e., "according to all due ways of acting". Under prin-
ciples made practical, laws - no matter if we now think only of "natu-
ral" or also of "positive" laws - prescribe possible actions that are 
lawful in due ways of being realized 80 • 
An (unnamed) conception of "omnipotence" emerges in Rep. exam. I 
d. 44 q. 1 n. 10, and there in order to explain how - and not why - God in 
his will can change the validity of some rule and institute the validity of 
another previously invalid. The notion is closely related to "absolute 
power", but it does not seem to have the same meaning as it. As to what 
God is able to do, Scotus affirms very generally that He can act in every 
way that does not involve contradiction - and he stresses that there are 
actually many ways of acting that do not involve contradiction. And it is 
only on account of this power for doing things that God can, as a conse-
quence, act differently than by ordinate power - that He can act through 
absolute power. Without using the words themselves, the paragraph raises 
interesting points about "omnipotence" and "absolute power" 81 • Accord-
ingly, with the support of Rep. exa.m. I d. 42, we might define omnipo-
tence as follows: · 
0: def, Omnipotence is the power that a being has for acting in every way 
that does not involve contradiction. 
Omnipotence so defined in Rep. exa.m. I d. 44 is very indeterminate and 
general - and, differently than in I d. 42, Scotus offers no further refine-
ments ofit, as he does elsewhere when entertaining the question whether 
it is an immediate power to do all possible things~ 2• Yet how should "abso-
lute power" (namely, the "absolute power" that a being like God has) finally 
be understood? This question, as we can see now, is equivalent to the ques-
tion about absolute power in the precise sense of an agent who is both cre-
ator/legislator of non-strict laws in a strong metaphysical sense and one 
who acts through free will and therefore can act differently than any estab-
lished ordination of laws (it having already been explained, moreover, that 
such an agent never actually acts inordinately). In the first place, we may 
repeat then a definition of absolute power given above: 
"" See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 9 (ed. Soder: 192-194): "Et sic voluntas facit hoc 
principium vel legem esse practicam, et istae leges ordinant operabilia secundum omnes 
modus agendi debitos". 
"' See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. n. 10 (ed. Soder: 194): "Deus autem potest agere omni 
modo qui non includit contradictionem. Cum ergo multi alii modi non includant 
contradictionem, potest agere aliter quam de potentia ordinata". 
"" See about this R. H. Pich, Onipotencia e conhecimento cientifico, in: C. A. 
Lertora-Mendoza (coord.), op. cit., p. 1-17; see also Rep. exam. Id. 42 q. 1-2 n. 1 et n. 12. 
18-19 (ed. Soder: 150, 154-156, 158). 
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AP: def 1 Absolute power is the power that a br,ing has of acting freely, differ-
ently than according to an established order of rules, and also of changing the 
given ordination. 
But actually the definition does not reveal the decisive connection, in 
the case of God as an agent, between "omnipotence" and "absolute power". 
The follmving definition communicates this better: 
AP: clef2 Absolute power is the power that an omnipotent lw1ng has of act-
ing freely, differently than according to an established order of rules, and 
also of changing the given ordination. 
The addition within the second definition is important, for omnipotence 
and absolute power do not strictly couple. Although for the relevant case of 
a being/agent like God, omnipotence entails absolute power ( and also ordi-
nate power qua power - both i.n matters of morals and of laws of nature), 
and absolute power presupposes omnipotence 0'\ each of these powers 
speci(y a particular and different aspect of action: since (strong or theologi-
cal) omnipotence means the ability to do (immediately) anything that can 
possibly be done (immediately), and absolute power means the ability to 
change freely an existing rule or order of rules, we can imagine an act of 
omnipotence - such as producing something totally new in nature, and not 
influencing its constitution - that does not change freely any existing order 
of rules. However, this reflection should remind us that omnipotence, just 
like absolute power, is a power for doing immediately any "moral possibles", 
where under a "moral possible" \Ve should understand a principle or rule of 
action that was made practical by a legislating ·will, but certainly not any-
thing like moral "ideas". 
Precisely how Goel has absolute povrnr and therefore exercises the 
power of freely changing any ordinate way of acting is ,vhat Scot us aims to 
express in even more precise terms. His effort takes the form of explaining 
God, the moral-metaphysical legislator (my expression), as a volitive being. 
All laws in a given order, which corresponds to the field within which be-
"'' I think this is also presupposed in Ord. Id. 44 q. un. n. 7 (ed. Vat. VI: :36:3~366): 
"Deus ergo, agere potens secundum illas red.as ut praefixae ~Lrnt ab eo, dicitur agere 
secundum potenliam orclinatam; ut autem potest multa agere quae non sunt secunclum 
illas leges iam praefixas, sed praeter illas, dicitur eius potentia absoluta: quia enim Deus 
quodlibet potest agere quod non includit contradictionem (et tales sunt multi modi aliiJ, 
ideo dicitur tune agere secundum potontiam absolutam". 
"
1 See also Leet. Id. 44 q. un. n. 4 (ed. Vat. XVII:534-585): "Sic Deus se habet in 
operando, narn intellectus - ut prior est voluntate - non statuit legem, sed offert primo 
voluntati suae; voluntas autem acceptat sic oblatmn, et tune statuitur lex; quia tamen 
opposita eorum quae statuta sunt, sunt possibilia, ideo potest legem mutare et aliter 
agere". 
"" According to Scotus in Ord. Id. 44 q. un. n. 6 (ed. Vat. VI: 365), the intellect of 
God precedes the act of divine will by showing the will certain formulations of law, but 
it is the will of God alone that make them laws: "Ad propositum ergo applicando, dico 
quad leges aliquae generales, recte dictantes, prnefixae sunt a voluntate divine et nun 
quidem ab intellectu divino ut praecedit actum voluntatis divinae, nt dictum est 
distinctione 38; sed quantu intellectus offert volnntati divinae talem legem, puta quad 
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ings have ordinate power, are submitted to the divine will 8\ and so the 
character of all laws in that order - their lawfulness - depends on the di-
vine wi11Bo. Scotus actually affirms this principle in respect of the justice or 
the being-just of such laws. Nevertheless, it seems simpler to understand 
the ''being-just" oflaws as their "lawfulness", "legal character" or "being-
prescriptive", for no particular account of justice is at issue 8i,_ In this sense 
one can better understand the following sentences as metaphysically con-
ditioned by the fundamental strict natural law principle and implying no 
moral arbitrariness 87 : "There is no just law [or: true law:I unless the divine 
will accepts it", but - so Scotus - never the contrary stance, such as "The 
divine will always accepts what is a just law [or: true law] per se" or "There 
are just laws lor: true lawsl independent of the acceptance of the divine will 
!and therefore per se ]"88 . It is important to realize that Scotus makes use of 
"acceptance" as a kind of decision, legislation or, as he explicitly says, "in-
stitution" (statuere) of a law. At any rate it is something dependent on a 
contingent volition or an act of will departing from God. And so it is not only 
the case that those laws are submitted to omnipotence and ordinate power 
with respect to their institution, but it is also the case that they are radi-
'omnis glorificandus, prius est gratificandus', si placet voluntati suae - quae Libera est 
- est recta lex, et ita est de aliis legibus". If one is not willing to assume this as a fac-
tual standpoint - as a "revelation" of prescriptions - one could at least assume it as a 
theoretical standpoint, given what was put forward about the basic conceivable natu-
ral law principle, strictly speaking. 
"" In Ord. Id. 44 q. un. n. 8 (ed. Vat. VI: 366) Scotus speaks of"upright law": "Uncle 
dico quod multa alia potest agere ordinate; et multa alia posse fieri ordinate, ab illis quae 
fiunt conformiter illis legibus, non includit contradictionem quando rectitudo huiusmodi 
legis - secundum quam dicitur quis mete et ordinate agere -. est in potestate ipsius 
agentis. ldeo sicut potest aliter agere, ita potest aliam Iegem rectam statuere, -- quae 
si statueretur a Deo, recta esset, quia nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus a voluntate divina 
acceptante est statuta; (. .. )". 
"7 It has been discussed in the literature whether such theses about the constitu-
tion of moral principles fit within an account of an ethics of divine commands, i.e., within 
a kind of ethical voluntarism that, metaphysically, is conditioned by the will of God sim-
pliciter, and epistemically makes both moral rationality very reduced and moral knowl-
edge decisively dependent on revelation. While I am convinced that they do not fit such 
un account, I cannot go into that discussion here. I believe that the study of H. Mtihlc, 
Scotus's Theory of Natural Law, in: Th. Williams {ed.), op. cit., pp. :312-313, 318f[, shows 
definitely that Scotus's theory of natural allows the conclusion that his moderate 
voluntarism in ethics is consistent with the demands of a rational and philosophical 
ethics. In recent literature Scotus's ethical "voluntarism" was defended by Th. Williams, 
The Unmitigated Scotus, in: Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 162-181; idem, 
The Libertarian F'oundations ofScotus's Moral Philosophy, in: The Thomist, pp. 193-215. 
See also L. Honnefolder, Duns Scotus, Section 4.2, for the argument that the highest 
form of freedom - say of "voluntarism" ~ in the case of God (and as would proportion-
ally be the case in the case of a creature) can according to Scotus only be realized 
through self-determination and the recognition of the good as such (a(fectio institiae). 
"See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. l n. 10 (ed. Soder: 194): "Secundo, quia istae leges 
subsunt voluntati divinae, eo quod nulla est lex iusta nisi quia voluntas divina acceptat, 
non aute111 c conversoH. 
,;,, The alternative opposites uelle and ,wile figure finely within a context - such as 
Rep. exam. Id. 44 - that puts emphasis on the absolute power of altering a given ordi-
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cally contingent within an order, for they are caused by an act under the 
modal operator of synchronic contingency, where the will can contingently 
"will or not-will" (uelle uel nolle) 89 • Because of this God can with no contra-
diction change what is contingently and actually instituted, whenever insti-
tuted by His ordinate power; i.e., God can «institute» another law in an 
order different than now. The result of this reflection is so powerful that the 
Subtle Doctor affirms that God can establish - as a moral-theological prin-
ciple in an order different than the present one - that He will save, with no 
further conditions, all rational souls, or the like 90 . 
The question at issue in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 is already positively 
settled - God can really produce things differently than what is actually 
produced - but Scotus still wants to deepen this determination at the meta-
physical level. The question ''Whether God might produce things differently 
than he did or differently than according to the order instituted by Him 
now" can only ultimately be solved by means of two forms of distinction: (a) 
"according to composition and division" (secundwn composit£onem et 
divisionem), and (b) concerning the order, i.e., "the law or the ordinate 
power" (cle orcline siue de lege vel potestate ordinata)H 1• In the first place, 
then, Scotus thinks it necessary to deepen the understanding of the contin-
gency of that decision that provohes the production of a given ordinate 
power, a contingency that signals as absolute power - the simply unreal-
nation. But for every act of the divine will under synchrnnic contingency, it is impnrtant 
to introduce its modes of indeterminacy as a first coniingent cause and - since it is ca-
pable of opposite actions and/or effects - as a genuine rational potency. The i divine) will 
is furthermore the self-determining and non-further-reducible main cause of volition. 
The will's power to opposites, which is simultaneous in the modus eliciendi, rests m on 
the "freedom of specification of willing" (libertas specificationis), i.e. of willing a (uelle) 
nr of not-wiHing a (nolle ), (ii') on the "freedom of doing the willing" Uibertas e_,:ercitii ), 
i.e. of willing (velle) a orb (a or -.. , a), and respectively of willing (vclle} a willing a or a 
not-willing a, and (ii") on the freedom (of doing or) refusing - refraining from - doing 
an act of willing (non velle, i.e. "non [doing al willing"). Self-determination (particularly 
in Quaestiones super libros metaphysicomm Aristotelis IX q. 15) seems to presuppose 
causally and ultimately (and with antecedence in a metaphysical sense) an indetermi-
natio (!X se from the part of the will, with respect to (i), (ii'), and (ii"). See R. H. Pich, 
Contingencia e liberdade, in: Joii.o Duns Scotus, Textos sobre poder, conh.ecime11to e 
contingencia, Section 3; L. Honnefolder, Duns Scotu.s, pp. 113-120. 
'"' See Rep. exam. I cl. 44 q. 1 n. 10 (eel_ Sodm·: 194): "Potest autem voluntus 
contingenter quodcumque velle vel nolle, ideo potest statuere aliam legem, ut quod 
omnis anima rntionalis salvabitur vel aliquid huiusrnodi. Ergo potentia eius absoluta 
non excedit orclinatam, quia quaecumque lex a Deo instituatur aliter vel alia quam ilia 
quae nunc est: esset ordinata". See also Leet. Id. 44 q. un. n. 4 (ed. Vat. XVII: 586): 
"Sicut statuit quod nullus esset glorificandus nisi prius esset gratificatus; operando 
autem huic legi ordinate, agit secundum potentiam ordinatam, et non potest aliter 
opermi nisi ordinando et statuendo aliam legem, - et hoc potest, quia contingenter voluit 
quod esset i!la lex quod omnis peccator danrnaretur; unde faciendo cont.rariurn, statuit 
aliam legem, secundum quam etiam ordinate operetur". 
"' See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 11 (ed. Slider: 194): "Ad quaestionem ergo dicendum 
est distinguenclo secundum compositionem et divisionem; similiter est distinguendum 
de orcline sive de lege vel potestate ordinata. Et patet realis solutio ex dictis". 
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ized but real possibility - the changeability of that ordination, and that 
comes back to the structural moment of God's volitions in a unique instant 
of eternity. The distinction bPtween scnsu composdo and srnsu cliviso shall 
clarify the logic of decisions or volitions, described in propositions, of the 
omnipotent and free agent. 
This can be accomplished by distinguishing the proposition - called 
hereafter "p" - "God can produce things differently than according to the 
chsposed order or than the order that He disposed" in tho::;e two scm;es. 
Proposition p is "false" and "impossible" in the sense of composition, be-
cause two elements do not remain at the same time: (il that God acts di/~ 
ferently than He disposed (through absolute power), and (ii) that the 
disposition of things and ordination established by God hold''". A scnsus 
composihonis stresses simultaneity of(i) and (ii) in the instant of eternity 
of God's decision concerning the production of a given order - and so it 
would propose something like "God wills a different order than o and at the 
same time wills the institution of o", or "Goel produces things differently 
than according to the dispm-rnd order and at the same time produces or 
keeps the disposed order). But Scot us emphasizes that proposition p is true 
sensu diuiso. This is so because God actually ma hes in this or that way and 
can at the same time make in the opposite ,,vay. Scotus is touching clearly 
the terms of his synchronic theory of contingent acts - as exposited again 
in Reportatio examinata Id. 39-40 q. 1-39:J_ In another passage, answering 
to the third argument ad contra, Scotus affirms that God can in eternity 
make opposite things chvisim, and not coniunctim, and can do such oppo-
site things "in the same instant" [of eternity] - declaring explicitly that he 
refers to the same strategy used to explain (synchronic contingency in) 
God's volitions concerning future contingents;i\ This means ( i) that God ac-
tually disposes that so-and-so must be done following an order, and su it 
holds just like in a moral order that follows the ten commandments, and Iii) 
that God can (in simultaneous possibility) indeed dispose differently, so 
that it would be needed to act differently, just like in a moral world where 
one of the ten commandments of the Second Table does not hold%_ A sen-
"" Sec Hrp. exam. l d. 44 q. 1 n. 11 lecl. Sodr:r: 194): "Uncle haec prnpositio 'Deus 
a liter res potesi producere quam secundurn ordinem dispositurn vel quam dispo.,uit' est 
distinguencla sccundum compositioncrn et clivisionem. In sonsu composilionis ,,st falsa 
ct impossibilis, quia non stant Himul quod alitl,r agat quam dispmrnit stantl• ilia 
dispositionc et orclinatione". 
"'' Seo m this respect the monograph by ,J. R. Siider, Kontingcnz 1111d Wissen, Die 
Lcltre von den futura contingcnti::i hci Jo/wnncs Duns Scollls, 1999, 
"' Sec Rep. exam. J cl. 44 q. 1 n. 16 (ed. Soder: 188): "Ad aliud dico qu(ld in 
i!dernitate possunt fieri opposita divisim, non coniunctim, et hoc in eodem in,tanti. 
Patet supra in matcria fnturis contingontibus". 
"' Sec Rep. tixa,n, I cl. 44 q. l n. 11. l(,d. Slider: 194); "ln senHU diviso est vern quia 
Deus facit hoc moclo ct ta men potcst opposito modo, qui a sicut Deus clisposuit sic cssc 
faciendum secundum hunc orclincm, ita possot ahter disponcrc, et tune csset a liter fa-
cicndurn". Logically, there i8 a conjunction here: x\\'pt, A Px-,Wpt, 1,x wills JJ at t, ol·t:ter~ 
nity and it po~siblc that x does not will pat t, of eternity 1. 
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sus diuisionis stresses a particular simultaneity of(i) and (ii) by proposing 
the division "God wills the institution ofo and at the same time God can will 
a diffor':!nt order than o", or "God produces or keeps the disposed order and 
at the same time God can produce things differently than according to 
that order". 
Interestingly enough, when Scotus exemplifies the second way of de-
termining p, he does not offer an example of the moral but of the natural 
order. A proposition p under sensus divisionis would mean that God has the 
potency of producing independently of the actual order that "The sun moves 
towards the east" (hence changing the factual "The sun moves towards the 
west"). Proposition p, a conjunction that gives expression to a synchronic 
contingency of actuality and possibility, would include "God can produce 
that the sun moves towards east" as one categoric proposition and "God ac-
tually disposes that the sun moves towards west" as the other categoric 
proposition, and both propositions, one of possibility and the other of actu-
ality, are true at the same time%. We must emphasize that both the ex-
ample here and the examples of regularities of nature in the quaestio show 
that Scotus does not think of the couple "absolute" and "ordinate" power as 
bringing consequences only to our understanding of moral order - as was 
the case in Lectura Id. 44 q. un. and Ordinatio I cl. 44 q. un. In Reportatio 
examinata Id. 44 q. 1, the consideration of God's absolute power is strongly 
directed toward understanding the contingency of the natural world as dis-
posed by an omnipotent power. But now it is still necessary to investigate 
again the main question through the second form of distinction advanced 
by Scotus, namely, concerning "the law or the ordinate power". 
To resolve the main question, i.e., by determining the proposition "God 
can produce things differently than according to the disposed order or than 
the order that He disposed", Scotus introduces the distinction "according to 
ordinate power" or "according to the order". What does this distinction 
mean? Scotus introduces two ways of conceiving ''order" (ordo): "order" can 
be taken (i) either according to universal rules or universal propositions (ii) 
or according to particular rules or particular propositionsu 7• The example of 
"" See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 11 (ed. Seider: 194): "Unde in sensu division is Deus 
habet potentiam faciencli hoc modo seorsum, scilicet 'solem mnveri contra orientem' --
haec una propositio categorica, 'non disposuit facere hoc moclo' -·-haec est alia propositio, 
et ambae sunt verae". 
'''Asimilar distinction comes forth in Ord. I cl. 44 q. un. n. 9 (ed. Vat. VI: '366): 
"Aclvertendum etiam est quocl aliquid esse ordinatum et ordinate fieri, hoc contingit. 
dupliciter: Uno moclo, ordine universali, - quod pertinet ad Iegern cnrnmunem, sicut 
nrdinatum est secundum legem communem 'nmnem finaliter peccatorern esse 
damnandum' (ut si rex statuat quod omnis homicida moriatur). Secundo modo, ordine 
particulari, - secundum hoc iudicium, ad quod non pertinet lex in universali, quia lex 
est de universalibus causis; de causa autem particulari non est lex, sec! iudiciurn secun-
dum legem, eius quod est contra legem (ut quocl iste homicida moriatur". 
''" See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 12 (ed. Seider: 194): "Ultra distinguendum est de 
potentia ordinata sive de ordine, quia ordo potest intelligi vel secundum regulas sive 
propositiones universales vel particulares. Universalis est 'omnis homicicla occidatur"'. 
SCOT\!S ON ABSOU1'1'!i; l'O\Vlm ,\Nil l,NOWLEDGE 
universal rule or proposition (now in a moral sense) is "Every murderer 
must be killed"; 18• And what is an order according to particular rules or 
propositions? It is the order of concrete judgment and of concrete execution: 
it is the concrete realization or application of the general rule, just as 
when a particular murderer is sentenced to be killed, and such a particu-
lar judgment is "the conclusion of the la,v"' 19• This should be an example 
of the levels of general and particular order: "Every murderer must be 
killed; John is a murderer; John must be killed". An order Gccording to 
particular propositions is then just the set of particular judgments as 
conclusions of practical arguments - namely, those particular judgrnet1ts 
that would follow as a logical consequence of the as,:mmption of given 
universal propositions or a given general order. But what is the signifi-
cance of this second form of distinction in order to :reach a determination 
of the main question and particularly of the proposition p as its corollary? 
It seems out of the question that, when Goel disposes an ordination, it 
disposes a set of universal rules or propositions; unless we definitely com-
promise human freedom, it makes no sense to think that He disposes the 
conclusions or particular judgments, but only the general prescription,; that 
can make them valid. To act de potentia ordinata is then both to dispose 
and to act according to a set of universal rules - and in moral-theological 
sense, one rule within thB set may be that "Every evil person must be con-
clBmned". I think that Scotus introduced the second distinction, the distinc-
tion between universal and particular order, for the sake of showing how 811 
absolute power comes to effect a change in an ordinate powur. If it is an 
example of a particular order that a particular man, Judas, must be con-
demned - "Judas must be condemned" as a simple application of that uni-
versal premise - and if it is the case that, within the range of an ordinate 
power composed by that universal premise, God cannot save Judas, then 
the only way to save Judas, if this is possible at all, is to change at some 
moment the ordinate power (or an aspect of it) where "Every evil person 
must be condemned" is a practical truth 10°. And this is to practice "absolute 
power". 'The minor premise is not supposed to change - ",Judas is an evil 
person" or "Judas has deeply sinned" - but it seems rather that for the 
motive of changing a particular order or a particular conclusion, i.e., be-
cause of a person and not simply for the sake of eilecting abso! ute power of 
"" See Rep. exam, I d. 44 q. 1 n. 12 (ed. Soder: 196.1: "Ordinatio au tern part.icu!aris 
est orclo iudicii ct executionis, ut de hoc homieidn in particulari orclinanclo quod 
occidatur. ct hoc iudicium non e~t nisi conclusio lugis". 
11111 In Or(le Id, 44 q. un. n. 11 {ed. Vat. Vf: :3b7-:3G8l, Sc()tus arnrms that an ordinate 
power is only said according to an order of univ,,rsal law, and nC'vcr according to rtn Cll'-
der of upright law in relation to some particular thing: "I'otentia tanwn ordinata non 
dicitur nisi secundurn ordinem legis universalis, non autern secundum orclinem legi~ 
rectae de aliquo particulari. (. .. ). Non quidcm ordine particulari (qui est quasi de isto 
agibili et operabili particulari tanturn ), sed nrdim, universali, quia si ,alvaret, slard modo 
cum legibus rectis ~ quas vere praefixit -·· de ,,alval.ione et damnationc singulornm". 
"
11 See also a similar point in: L, Parisoli, Ln contraddizionr ,,cr·a. Giouarwi Duns 
Srnto tm le necessita della metafi81ca e ii di,;corso de/la fi:losofi.a praticrr, p. 182, 
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changing valid ruhis 101, God comes to alter universal principles contin-
gently established as valid laws. If Judas would exist but would not be con-
demned, then a universally valid proposition would have been freely 
canceled out and changed into, for example, "Every evil person will be 
assisted by the grace of God". Thus, C}od could "assist" (pracvenire) Judas 
by grace if He willed, just like God did in relation to Peter after Peter had 
sinned; God would have saved a now condemned and gravely sinful ,Judas 
"in a particular order" or "in a particular conclusion", justified then by a 
prescription effected by a transforming absolute power 1/J\ Abc;olute power 
here becomes a sign of God's mercy and grace, for in order to save a hu-
man being, (,ach time the intention of changing a particular order urges 
the (legitimate) change of an ordination of punishing justic01 ~ as can ap-
proximately be known through the Holy Scripture and common revela-
tion. Being omniscient, God actually and previously kno,,vs about a 
particular existing hurnm1 being and whether he by himself shall be con-
c1emned (in case this applies based on the universal rules established 
within the plan of Goel t.o the world). God as universal legislator can, 
then, de potenha absoluta, or by changing a given moral-theological ordi-
nation of rules, and de potentia ordincda, or by instituting, for the occa-
sion and time He wills, a new moral-theologicnl ordination of rules, 
produce different particular conclusions 10:1. As becomes clear from this 
case, what is essentially right and ,iu::;t is definitely what God wills to be 
right and just - eventually against general expectations of our rational 
moral appraisal. And it is also clear that Scotus, who makes the potentia 
(lhsoluta I ordinata distinction the "backbone" of his theory of "justifica-
tion" or acceptah'.o and of his moral (or natural law) theory, emphasizes 
the canonist "juridical meaning" of itHH_ But there is more to be said 
about that. 
(To be continued) 
rns See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 13 (ed. Soder: Hl6): ·'Ad propositum: Deus posui1 
legern univernalem et ordincrn quod omnis nwl us damnabitu 1·. Ordo particu!aris est. qui 
dicilur iudicium quod isle, id (<Si IudaE, damnali1tur. Dico qund Deus polcnt.ia ab,oluta 
potesl salvarc ludam, non tamuI1 potentia ordinata. Simi liter potest eurn salvan• ordine 
parlitu lari. si l uclas ;;ssel et non es set darn natus, qui a po.,set eum praevt,nire per 
gratiam. sicut et Pt,trurn post pcccatum". See also Ord. I ci. 44 q. un. n. 11 (ed. Vat. VI: 
:rnsl. "Staret enim cum illa 'quod linalit0r malu.s damnnbitur' (quae est lex praefixn de 
damnandis), quia iste adhuc non lin,1liter p;;crntor, sed potest esii;; non peccat.or (maxirne 
dum est in via). quia potest Deus cum gratia sua praevenire: (. .. /. Non aut.ern staret, cum 
ilia parttculari lege, quod ludam salvaret: Iudarn cnirn pot.est praescire salvandum de 
polentia urdinata, sed non isto nwdo orclinata sed absolula ah isto rnodo, et alio modo 
ordinata sccunclum aliquum alium ordinem, quia secundum alium ordinem tune 
possibilem inslit.ui". 
'"" See Re/J. exam. Id. 44 q. l n. rn lt:d. Soder: 196): "Uncle iste praescitus exi~tens, 
litct. darnnabitur, t.amen potest potent.ia absoluta et potentia ordinat.a beatificari; non 
tamen ludas pott•nt.ia (1rdinata'·. 
m, See nguin W. ,!. Courtenay, IV, The Di:ilcdic of Divine Omnipotence, in: \V. ,J. 
Courtenay, op. cit., pp. 11-1:3; idem, Cctpacity and ·vohtiun. pp. 92-95, J.00-10:J, 
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ABSTRACT 
In Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1, Scotus offers n discussion, unique within his work. 
of cases in which a traditional account of "scientific knowledge" of nu tun• is trans-
formed into a lmowleclge "as in most cases" (rd in p{uribu.s). Underlying this particu-
lar model of scientific knowledge is an account of God's omnipotence and ab,;olutc 
power. With the aim of explaining this model, this study explores certain fundamen-
tal theoretical elements of Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1, i.e., definitions o[divine omnipo-
tence c1nd absolute power and Scotus's general theory of contingency, as well as the 
background context of contingency and divine scientia in Rep. exam. Id. :33-44. The 
stage is then set. for the introduction of the idea of a knowledge "as in most cases", 
which Scot us had likely encountered in Analylica postcriora. Possible connections 
between omnipotence, absolute powt>r, and kno,vledge ul in plu ribu:, are then ana-
lyzed. Because Scotus's model ofscicntia ut in plurihus depends heavily on a critical 
view of the regularity of heavenly bodies' movements, som," notes Oll Scotus's cos-
mology are offered, as well as a comparison between tbt, scope ofScotus's "probable" 
kmnvledgc of nature and Aristotle's view of the samtc within rnnny pnssngt"s nl' his 
opera concerning the knowledge of physical universals. 
